152

British attacked again at the same spot from the 10th onwards in great strength, but not really on a grand scale.[51*]

The capture of the French document disclosing the Nivelle objective on the Aisne had helped the British Army, for it induced the Germans to concentrate their reserves behind the Chemin des Dames. We were therefore able not only to break the German line but at one point to advance six miles. One officer told me that he marched with his company a quarter of a mile beyond the point at which his battalion was ordered to stop, but found no Germans except a few stragglers who surrendered without a struggle. The following day that evacuated ground was reoccupied by the enemy. The failure to press the attack *Our cavalry* home with the whole strength of the *responsible* British forces was probably due to the cavalry obsession which pervaded the hearts as well as the minds of the horse soldiers who commanded the British Army in campaigns where engineering, artillery and infantry tactics meant everything and cavalry charges worse than nothing. Thousands upon thousands of horsemen were assembled at a convenient point behind the line ready to dash through the rent in the German Front. Nothing came of it except the death gallop of Monchy, where horses and horsemen were mown down by a few

machine-gunners as soon as they came within range.
Infantry had to be called in to capture the village.
Cavalry were only an impediment in the advance.
They postponed appropriate measures until it was too late to use them. With cavalry the policy of

* "My War Memories," General Ludendorff, Vol. II, pp. 421-423.

This expression of the German view of the first day's fighting at Arras is confirmed by General von Hindenburg. *vide* Appendix at end of chapter, p. 1539-